

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

IE University

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Degree course: THIRD

Semester: 2^o

Category: COMPULSORY

Number of credits: 6.0

Language: English

PREREQUISITES

SUBJECT DESCRIPTION

The international system is often termed “anarchic” because there is no authority above that of individual nations. In a globalized world it is essential to understand how governance occurs at a scale that goes beyond the nation-state, so this course will examine the fundamental dynamics of global governance from the perspective of international organizations (IOs). It examines the main concepts and theories related to global governance, its historical evolution, regional connections, fundamental political areas, and institutional schemes, offering a comprehensive introduction.

Global challenges such as terrorism, pandemics, climate change, poverty and the increasing pace of globalization have created the need for cooperation, structure and order in the international system. But the quest for rules and institutions to govern the world has met with some resistance from states and governments. Indeed, there is an inherent tension between national sovereignty and the trend toward supranational policymaking. What role should international organizations have? Who should control them and to whom are they accountable?

This course explores the institutions that facilitate international cooperation. Although there is no world government that forces countries to get along and stick to their agreements, the international system features much more cooperation than conflict. How can international organizations like the UN, the IMF, and the WTO help states to avoid crises and reach outcomes that leave all sides better off? What are the strengths and limitations of these institutions? How might they help the international community deal with future threats like climate change?

In this course, we will search for answers to these questions. Specifically, we will look at a wide range of international institutions and how they operate in theory and practice. We will also examine broader debates about why institutions develop and what they can and cannot accomplish. The course will, therefore, comprise a mix of academic and policy debates pertaining to the role and policy scope of IOs in the current era.

OBJECTIVES AND SKILLS

This course has three main goals: First, to improve students' understanding of how international institutions can encourage cooperation between countries; second, to provide students with a much deeper knowledge of a variety of different types of international institutions—including global organizations like the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, regional institutions like the European Union, and a number of different non-governmental organizations; third, to give students a better understanding of international negotiations and the roles that international institutions can play.

Both theories and evidence about the role of international institutions in promoting cooperation will be introduced and critically examined throughout the course. We shall seek to learn how institutions facilitate cooperation between states, between states and non-state actors, and among non-state actors. To do so, we start by considering some basic conceptual and theoretical questions in the study of international organization: How do we define cooperation? How can we observe and measure it? How can international institutions help states and non-state actors to overcome dilemmas of cooperation, and under what conditions? What is the role of power in shaping cooperation? What is the role of political and scientific uncertainty? What determines the design of particular institutions? What are the effects of domestic politics on the operation of international institutions? Through what processes do international institutions change over time?

The aspiration of the course is to go beyond taking stock of facts and theories and to inspire students' appreciation for broader global governance challenges by engaging in a critical analysis of the need for institutional reform and possible approaches. We will reflect together on the ongoing transformation of the international system and discuss cutting-edge scholarly ideas about how the global governance architecture could be adapted to new transnational threats and emerging opportunities.

Students will acquire a strong foundation in the history, role, structure, activities, and governance efforts of both state-centred international institutions and non-state actors. Students will also analyze challenges and problems in global governance, and come up with possible solutions to those problems. This course will take a practical, interactive and applied approach to international organization through case-study analysis, presentations, written assignments, and active in-class debates, and game simulations, both in person and online.

In terms of skills, students will be able to identify the main governance challenges of our globalized world, to understand the basic functioning of the network of regional, continental, and global institutions, and to reflect rigorously about policy solutions on a global scale. This course is ideal for those seeking to work for an international organization.

METHODOLOGY

The aim of the lectures is to offer a rigorous academic training in a friendly and relaxed environment, where students are encouraged to put themselves in the shoes of political leaders. In light of the IE concept of "liquid learning", the course will consist of synchronous face-to-face (F2F) sessions and asynchronous non-class learning (NCL) sessions. **NCL sessions** will amount to case-study material that students are expected to prepare in advance of the related seminar sessions. We will use **F2F seminars** to introduce new material, go over practice case-studies, engage in related in-class exercises, and revise the material for the exams. During the first half of a class there will be a presentation which goes through the essentials of the session's topic and the second half will be dedicated to stimulating class discussions and team presentations. The midterm exam will take place online during a synchronous 90-minute VC session.

The course consists of 30 sessions in total including lectures, seminar discussions and in-class exercises, exams, and student presentations. At the beginning of the semester there will be a detailed description of each session. Students are expected to have done the required readings for each session (preferably before the in-class seminar on each topic). Seminar discussions, debates, and in-class exercises are meant to provide critical summaries of readings, challenge some of the ideas or questions raised therein, develop new research questions, and discuss applications of theories to ongoing developments and current context. Seminar questions will be posted ahead of time as a focal guide through the readings and the relevant themes and concepts. Students will have the opportunity to debate issues both in class as well as through the course page and the Discussion Board.

I will always be happy to provide support and guidance to students and help you in your academic and professional aspirations; so if you have any questions, feel free to schedule an appointment.

Teaching methodology	Weighting	Estimated time a student should dedicate to prepare for and participate in
Lectures	33.33 %	50 hours
Discussions	10.0 %	15 hours
Exercises	6.67 %	10 hours
Group work	10.0 %	15 hours
Other individual studying	40.0 %	60 hours
TOTAL	100.0 %	150 hours

PROGRAM

READINGS FOR THE COURSE

The course textbook is: **Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson. (2018). *International Organization and Global Governance*. 2nd. Routledge. ISBN 9781138236585 (Printed/Electronic)**. Classes are based on chapters of the textbook, journal articles, case studies or other materials. The list of readings will be provided by the beginning of the course.

The list of readings is divided into required and recommended ones. Everyone is expected to have done the former in preparation for each session (especially seminars). The latter are generally intended for those more interested in a particular topic, those planning to write a paper on the topic, or those preparing a debate presentation on the topic. The majority of readings consist of articles from major journals in the field (*American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Global Policy, International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Review of International Political Economy, The Review of International Organization, The World Economy, World Politics*, etc.), as well as a few online publications, working papers, and unpublished manuscripts available online (some links will be provided). If you cannot access a listed reading you are interested in, please let me know.

Original treaty texts and sources tend to be quite technical and legalistic and are, therefore, not featured in the reading list, but they are certainly recommended especially for the purposes of essay-writing with a focus on specific IOs. In fact, students should familiarize themselves with w e b - b a s e d r e s o u r c e s a n d I O w e b s i t e s (such as <http://www.ecb.int/>, <http://www.oecd.org>, <http://www.wto.org>, <http://www.imf.org>, and <http://www.worldbank.org>). In this course, there is also a strong emphasis on keeping abreast of and critically evaluating current affairs; hence, students are encouraged to consult, cite, and quote material from the International Herald Tribune (<http://www.ihf.com/>), the New York Times (<http://www.nytimes.com/>), National Public Radio (www.npr.org), the Los Angeles Times (<http://www.latimes.com/>), The Economist (<http://www.economist.com/>), the Financial Times (<http://news.ft.com/home/>), Politico (<https://www.politico.com/>), Project Syndicate (<https://www.project-syndicate.org/>), VOXEU (<https://voxeu.org/>), Monkey Cage (<https://www.washingtonpost.com/monkey-cage/>) (as well as other mainstream or non-mainstream news sources and blogs). Students are strongly encouraged to follow closely international developments and keep abreast of the responses of major international organizations and their activities, which would enhance your understanding of how these institutions operate.

In light of the positivistic approach of this course, some of the readings will be methodologically rich and heavy. This, of course, does not imply that students will be expected to fully comprehend (or even replicate) the empirics or formal theories employed in these papers. Students will instead have to develop a grasp of the overall research design (in terms of the research question, the testable hypotheses, the identification and empirical operationalization strategy, and the conclusions of the causal inference).

SESSION 1 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

Introduction to International Organization and Global Governance (Lecture/Seminar)

Book Chapters: International Organization and Global Governance (Introduction 3-13, Chapter 1 "The Emergence of Global Governance" 25-36) (See Bibliography)

Recommended:

- Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics* 38(1): 226-254.
- Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations," *International Organization* 53(4): 699-732.
- Botcheva, Liliana, and Lisa L. Martin. 2001. "Institutional Effects on State Behavior: Convergence and Divergence," *International Studies Quarterly* 45(1): 1-26.
- Frieden, Jeffrey A., David A. Lake, and Kenneth A. Schultz. 2018. *World Politics: Interests, Interactions and Institutions* (4th ed.), New York, NY: W. W. Norton, chs. 1-2.
- Gruber, Lloyd. 2000. *Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, chs. 2-3.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Jana von Stein, and Erik Gartzke. 2008. "International Organizations Count," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(2): 175-88.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, chs. 1, 6.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1988. "International Institutions: Two Approaches," *International Studies Quarterly* 32(4): 379-96.
- Keohane, Robert, and Lisa Martin. 1995. "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," *International Security* 20(1): 39-51.
- Krasner, Stephen. 1982. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," *International Organization* 36(2): 185-205.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 1994/95. "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19(3): 5-49.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 1995. "A Realist Reply," *International Security* 20(1): 82-93.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31(4): 483-496.
- Oye, Kenneth A. 1985. "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," *World Politics* 38(1): 1-24.
- Ruggie, John G. 1982. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," *International Organization* 36(2): 379-415.
- Schneider, Christina. 2011. "Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power in International Organizations," *International Studies Quarterly* 55(2): 331-355.

- Snidal, Duncan. 1985. "Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes," *American Political Science Review* 79(4): 923-942.
- Snidal, Duncan. 1985. "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," *International Organization* 39(4): 579-614.
- Snidal, Duncan. 1985. "The Game Theory of International Politics," *World Politics* 38(1): 25-57.
- Svobik, Milan. 2006. "Lies, Defection, and the Pattern of International Cooperation," *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4): 909-925.

SESSION 2 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

Introduction to Global Governance and International Institutions: Competing Theoretical Approaches (Lecture/Seminar)

Book Chapters: International Organisations and Institutions (2012, Handbook of International Relations. Sage Publications, 326-351) (CED)

Recommended:

- Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics* 38(1): 226-254.
- Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations," *International Organization* 53(4): 699-732.
- Botcheva, Liliana, and Lisa L. Martin. 2001. "Institutional Effects on State Behavior: Convergence and Divergence," *International Studies Quarterly* 45(1): 1-26.
- Frieden, Jeffrey A., David A. Lake, and Kenneth A. Schultz. 2018. *World Politics: Interests, Interactions and Institutions* (4th ed.), New York, NY: W. W. Norton, chs. 1-2.
- Gruber, Lloyd. 2000. *Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, chs. 2-3.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Jana von Stein, and Erik Gartzke. 2008. "International Organizations Count," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(2): 175-88.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, chs. 1, 6.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1988. "International Institutions: Two Approaches," *International Studies Quarterly* 32(4): 379-96.
- Keohane, Robert, and Lisa Martin. 1995. "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security* 20(1): 39-51.
- Krasner, Stephen. 1982. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," *International Organization* 36(2): 185-205.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 1994/95. "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19(3): 5-49.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 1995. "A Realist Reply," *International Security* 20(1): 82-93.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31(4): 483-496.
- Oye, Kenneth A. 1985. "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," *World Politics* 38(1): 1-24.
- Ruggie, John G. 1982. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," *International Organization* 36(2): 379-415.

- Schneider, Christina. 2011. "Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power in International Organizations," *International Studies Quarterly* 55(2): 331-355.
- Snidal, Duncan. 1985. "Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes," *American Political Science Review* 79(4): 923-942.
- Snidal, Duncan. 1985. "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," *International Organization* 39(4): 579-614.
- Snidal, Duncan. 1985. "The Game Theory of International Politics," *World Politics* 38(1): 25-57.
- Svobik, Milan. 2006. "Lies, Defection, and the Pattern of International Cooperation," *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4): 909-925.

SESSION 3 (ASYNCHRONOUS)

Discussion forum: The G7 and the G20 in the global governance landscape

Instructions and materials will be provided at the beginning of the semester.

SESSION 4 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

The Rational Design and Variable Geometry of International organizations

The Logic of Two- and Three-Level Games (Lecture/Seminar)

Article: *Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations* (*Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(1): 3-32. 1998) (CED)

Article: *The Rational Design of International Institutions* (*International Organization* 55(4): 761-799. 2001) (CED)

Article: *Principal-agent Problems in International Organizations* (*The Review of International Organizations* 1(2): 125-138. 2006)

Article: *Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games* (*International Organization*, vol. 42, no. 3, 1988, pp. 427-460) (CED)

Recommended:

- Abbott, Kenneth, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Ann-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal. 2000. "The Concept of Legalization," *International Organization* 54(3): 401-419.
- Baccini, Leonardo, Andreas Dür, and Manfred Elsig. 2013. "Preferential Trade Agreements: Design Matters!" VoxEU, CEPR Policy Portal, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
- Baccini, Leonardo, Andreas Dür, Manfred Elsig. 2015. "The Politics of Trade Agreement Design: Revisiting the Depth-Flexibility Nexus," *International Studies Quarterly* 59(4): 765-775.
- Copelovitch, Mark S., and Tonya L. Putnam. 2014. "Design in Context: Existing International Agreements and New Cooperation," *International Organization* 68(2): 471-493.
- Fang, Songying. 2008. "The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics," *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2): 304-321.
- Fang, Songying, and Randall W. Stone. 2012. "International Organizations as Policy Advisors," *International Organization* 66(4): 537-569.
- Gilligan, Michael J. 2004. "Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral Agreements?" *International Organization* 58(3): 459-484.
- Goldstein, Judith, and Lisa Martin. 2000. "Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics," *International Organization* 54(3): 603-632.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Laurence Helfer, and Christopher J. Fariss, 2011. "Emergency and

- Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties," *International Organization* 65(4): 673-707.
- Hawkins, Darren, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney. 2006. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, ch. 1.
 - Kahler, Miles. 2000. "Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case," *International Organization* 54(3): 549-71.
 - Konstantinidis, Nikitas, and Karagiannis, Yannis. (2020). "Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Incentives for Reform: An Informational Mechanism of E(M)U Conditionality," *Review of International Organizations* 15: 601-632.
 - Koremenos, Barbara. 2001. "Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility," *International Organization* 55(2): 289-325.
 - Kucik, Jeffrey, and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. "Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime," *International Organization* 62(3): 477-505.
 - Maggi, Giovanni, and Massimo Morelli. 2006. "Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organisations," *American Economic Review* 96(4): 1137-58.
 - Pelc, Krzysztof. 2009. "Seeking Escape: The Use of Escape Clauses in International Trade Agreements," *International Studies Quarterly* 53(2): 349-368.
 - Rosendorff, Peter, and Helen Milner. 2001. "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape," *International Organization* 55(4): 829-857.
 - Thompson, Alexander, and Daniel Verdier. 2014. "Multilateralism, Bilateralism and Institutional Design," *International Studies Quarterly* 58(1): 15-28.
 - Vabulas, Felicity, and Duncan Snidal. 2013. "Organization without Delegation: Informal Intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) and the Spectrum of Intergovernmental Arrangements," *The Review of International Organizations* 8(2): 193-220.
 - Verdier, Daniel. 2008. "Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime," *International Organization* 62(2): 439-76.
 - Waylen, Georgina. 2014. "Informal Institutions, Institutional Change, and Gender Equality," *Political Research Quarterly* 67(1): 212-223.
 - Wendt, Alexander. 2011. "Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design," *International Organization* 55(4): 1019-1049.

SESSION 5 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

The Rational Design and Variable Geometry of International organizations

The Logic of Two- and Three-Level Games (Lecture/Seminar)

Recommended:

- Abbott, Kenneth, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Ann-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal. 2000. "The Concept of Legalization," *International Organization* 54(3): 401-419.
- Baccini, Leonardo, Andreas Dür, and Manfred Elsig. 2013. "Preferential Trade Agreements: Design Matters!" VoxEU, CEPR Policy Portal, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
- Baccini, Leonardo, Andreas Dür, Manfred Elsig. 2015. "The Politics of Trade Agreement Design: Revisiting the Depth-Flexibility Nexus," *International Studies Quarterly* 59(4): 765-775.
- Copelovitch, Mark S., and Tonya L. Putnam. 2014. "Design in Context: Existing International

- Agreements and New Cooperation," *International Organization* 68(2): 471-493.
- Fang, Songying. 2008. "The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics," *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2): 304-321.
 - Fang, Songying, and Randall W. Stone. 2012. "International Organizations as Policy Advisors," *International Organization* 66(4): 537-569.
 - Gilligan, Michael J. 2004. "Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral Agreements?" *International Organization* 58(3): 459-484.
 - Goldstein, Judith, and Lisa Martin. 2000. "Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics," *International Organization* 54(3): 603-632.
 - Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Laurence Helfer, and Christopher J. Fariss, 2011. "Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties," *International Organization* 65(4): 673-707.
 - Hawkins, Darren, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney. 2006. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, ch. 1.
 - Kahler, Miles. 2000. "Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case," *International Organization* 54(3): 549-71.
 - Konstantinidis, Nikitas, and Karagiannis, Yannis. (2020). "Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Incentives for Reform: An Informational Mechanism of E(M)U Conditionality," *Review of International Organizations* 15: 601-632.
 - Koremenos, Barbara. 2001. "Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility," *International Organization* 55(2): 289-325.
 - Kucik, Jeffrey, and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. "Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime," *International Organization* 62(3): 477-505.
 - Maggi, Giovanni, and Massimo Morelli. 2006. "Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organisations," *American Economic Review* 96(4): 1137-58.
 - Pelc, Krzysztof. 2009. "Seeking Escape: The Use of Escape Clauses in International Trade Agreements," *International Studies Quarterly* 53(2): 349-368.
 - Rosendorff, Peter, and Helen Milner. 2001. "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape," *International Organization* 55(4): 829-857.
 - Thompson, Alexander, and Daniel Verdier. 2014. "Multilateralism, Bilateralism and Institutional Design," *International Studies Quarterly* 58(1): 15-28.
 - Vabulas, Felicity, and Duncan Snidal. 2013. "Organization without Delegation: Informal Intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) and the Spectrum of Intergovernmental Arrangements," *The Review of International Organizations* 8(2): 193-220.
 - Verdier, Daniel. 2008. "Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime," *International Organization* 62(2): 439-76.
 - Waylen, Georgina. 2014. "Informal Institutions, Institutional Change, and Gender Equality," *Political Research Quarterly* 67(1): 212-223.
 - Wendt, Alexander. 2011. "Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design," *International Organization* 55(4): 1019-1049.

SESSION 6 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

Interactive Simulation: The Tragedy of the Commons in Space and Cyber Affairs

In this interactive simulation, students will learn how to manage multiple collective action problems related to space and cyber affairs simultaneously. Students will be grouped into teams that represent different countries. The goal of the game is to maximize your country's space and cyber capabilities. However, a number of problems will arise which will give players strong reason to try to work together as opposed to go it alone.

The first key challenge is that while countries can benefit by launching space stations into orbit, if space gets too crowded with space stations, collisions are likely to occur. If enough collisions happen, this could set off a chain reaction of more collisions that ultimately makes space unusable. Thus, countries have strong reason to make sure that they collectively use space in a sustainable way. A second challenge involves technological advancement. Countries can acquire certain technologies that enhance their space and cyber power by investing in research. However, it is also possible to obtain technologies through cooperative technology sharing or adversarial cyber attacks. How players end up distributing the costs of technological advancement is a key aspect of the game. Lastly, cyber attacks provide countries with opportunities to weaken their potential rivals, which create many chances for conflict throughout the game. The dynamics of this challenge also change when countries acquire technologies that can anonymize their cyber attacks.

The game has many possible outcomes, depending on what strategies the players decide to adopt. It is meant to illustrate the contingency of human interaction, as well as to give students a chance to engage with the cooperative/competitive nature of complex social processes.

Games & Simulations: Facing New Challenges in Space & Cyber Affairs: SpaceGov (IRE090056-U-ENG-HTM)

SESSION 7 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

Interactive Simulation: The Tragedy of the Commons in Space and Cyber Affairs

SESSION 8 (ASYNCHRONOUS)

Case-study

Practical Case: The Greek Crisis: Tragedy or Opportunity (HBS 711088-PDF-ENG)

SESSION 9 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

Regional Organizations and Regional Integration (Lecture/Seminar)

Book Chapters: International Organization and Global Governance (Chapter 18 "Regional Governance and Regional Organizations" 250-267, Chapter 19 "The European Union" 268-282) (CED)

Book Chapters: The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, chs. 2-3. 1999) (CED)

Recommended:

- Alesina, Alberto, Ignazio Angeloni, and Federico Etro. 2005. "International Unions," *American Economic Review*, 95(3): 602-615.
- Baldwin, Richard. E. 2006. "Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade," *World Economy* 29(11): 1451-1518.
- Baldwin, Richard E. 1993. "A Domino Theory of Regionalism," NBER Working Paper No. 4465.
- Bhagwati, Jagdish. 1992. "Regionalism Versus Multilateralism," *World Economy* 15(5): 535-555.
- Copelovitch, Mark, Jeffry A. Frieden, and Stephanie Walter. 2016. "The Political Economy of

- the Euro Crisis," *Comparative Political Studies* 49(7): 811-840.
- De Grauwe, Paul. 2011. "Governance of a Fragile Eurozone," CEPS Working Document No. 346, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, May.
 - De Grauwe, Paul. 2012. *Economics of Monetary Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 9th ed.
 - Frieden, Jeffrey A., and Stefanie Walter. 2017. "Understanding the Political Economy of the Eurozone Crisis," *Annual Review of Political Science* 20(1): 371-390.
 - Konstantinidis, Nikitas. 2008. "Gradualism and Uncertainty in International Union Formation: The European Community's First Enlargement," *The Review of International Organizations* 3(4): 399-433.
 - Konstantinidis, Nikitas. 2015. "On the Political Geometry of International Unions: A Coalition-theoretic Approach," *Research in Economics* 69(3): 453-473.
 - Karagiannis, Yannis, and Nikitas Konstantinidis. 2015. "On the Conditional Success of International Conditionality Policies (With Evidence from Greece and Spain During the Eurozone Crisis)," *Global Policy* 6(3): 212-221.
 - Konstantinidis, Nikitas, and Ruben Treurniet. 2018. "The Economic and Monetary Union and Accountability: The 'Globalization Trilemma'," In: Nikolaos Zahariadis and Laurie Buonanno (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of European Public Policy*, London: Routledge.
 - Mansfield, Edward, and Helen V. Milner. 1999. "The New Wave of Regionalism," *International Organization* 53(3): 589-627.
 - Mansfield, Edward D. and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. "Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements," *International Organization* 57(4): 829-862.
 - Winters, L. Alan. 1996. "Regionalism versus Multilateralism," World Bank Policy Research Paper 1687.

SESSION 10 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

Regional Organizations and Regional Integration (Lecture/Seminar)

Article: Enhancing Global Governance through Regional Integration (Global Governance 12(3): 233–40. 2006) (CED)

Recommended:

- Alesina, Alberto, Ignazio Angeloni, and Federico Etro. 2005. "International Unions," *American Economic Review*, 95(3): 602-615.
- Baldwin, Richard. E. 2006. "Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade," *World Economy* 29(11): 1451-1518.
- Baldwin, Richard E. 1993. "A Domino Theory of Regionalism," NBER Working Paper No. 4465.
- Bhagwati, Jagdish. 1992. "Regionalism Versus Multilateralism," *World Economy* 15(5): 535-555.
- Copelovitch, Mark, Jeffrey A. Frieden, and Stephanie Walter. 2016. "The Political Economy of the Euro Crisis," *Comparative Political Studies* 49(7): 811-840.
- De Grauwe, Paul. 2011. "Governance of a Fragile Eurozone," CEPS Working Document No. 346, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, May.
- De Grauwe, Paul. 2012. *Economics of Monetary Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 9th

ed.

- Frieden, Jeffry A., and Stefanie Walter. 2017. "Understanding the Political Economy of the Eurozone Crisis," *Annual Review of Political Science* 20(1): 371-390.
- Konstantinidis, Nikitas. 2008. "Gradualism and Uncertainty in International Union Formation: The European Community's First Enlargement," *The Review of International Organizations* 3(4): 399-433.
- Konstantinidis, Nikitas. 2015. "On the Political Geometry of International Unions: A Coalition-theoretic Approach," *Research in Economics* 69(3): 453-473.
- Karagiannis, Yannis, and Nikitas Konstantinidis. 2015. "On the Conditional Success of International Conditionality Policies (With Evidence from Greece and Spain During the Eurozone Crisis)," *Global Policy* 6(3): 212-221.
- Konstantinidis, Nikitas, and Ruben Treurniet. 2018. "The Economic and Monetary Union and Accountability: The 'Globalization Trilemma'," In: Nikolaos Zahariadis and Laurie Buonanno (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of European Public Policy*, London: Routledge.
- Mansfield, Edward, and Helen V. Milner. 1999. "The New Wave of Regionalism," *International Organization* 53(3): 589-627.
- Mansfield, Edward D. and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. "Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements," *International Organization* 57(4): 829-862.
- Winters, L. Alan. 1996. "Regionalism versus Multilateralism," World Bank Policy Research Paper 1687.

SESSION 11 (ASYNCHRONOUS)

Case-study

Practical Case: Unilever's New Global Strategy: Competing through Sustainability (HBS 916414-PDF-ENG)

SESSION 12 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

Non-state Actors in Global Governance: Global Corporations, Civil society, NGOs, Think Tanks, Global Philanthropy (Lecture/Seminar)

Book Chapters: International Organization and Global Governance (Chapter 24 "Global Corporations" (341-350), Chapter 25 "Civil Society & NGOs" (351-364), Chapter 28 "Think-tanks and Global Policy Networks" (391-407), Chapter 29 "Global Philanthropy" (408-422) (See Bibliography)

Article: The Idea of Global Civil Society (International Affairs 79 (3): 583-93. 2003) (CED)

Article: Transnational corporations and global governance (Review of Sociology. 2018) (CED)

Recommended:

- Carpenter, R. Charli. 2007. "Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issue Emergence and Nonemergence in Transnational Advocacy Networks," *International Studies Quarterly* 51(1): 99-120.
- Cooley, Alexander, and James Ron. 2002. "The NGO Scramble," *International Security*, 27(1): 5-39.
- Ingram, Paul, Jeffrey Robinson, and Marc L. Busch. 2005. "The Intergovernmental Network of World Trade: IGO Connectedness, Governance, and Embeddedness," *American Journal of*

- Sociology* 111(3): 824-858.
- Karns, Margaret P., and Karen A. Mingst. 2015. *International Organizations*. The Politics and Processes of Global Governance (Chapter 6, "Nonstate Actors: NGOs, Networks, and Social Movements").
 - Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, chs.1,3.
 - Kim, Dongwood. 2013 "International Nongovernmental Organizations and the Global Diffusion of National Human Rights Institutions," *International Organization* 67(3): 505–539.
 - Murdie, Amanda, and Alexander Hicks. 2013. "Can International Nongovernmental Organizations Boost Government Services? The Case of Health," *International Organization* 67(3): 541-573.
 - Murdie, Amanda, and Dursun Peksen. 2014. "The Impact of Human Rights INGO Shaming on Humanitarian Interventions," *Journal of Politics* 76(1): 215-228.
 - Murdie, Amanda. 2014. "The Ties that Bind: A Network Analysis of Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations," *British Journal of Political Science* 44(1): 1-27.
 - Price, Richard M. 2003. "Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics," *World Politics* 55(4): 579-606.
 - Price, Richard. 1998. "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," *International Organization* 52(3): 613-644.
 - Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995. "Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction" In: Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
 - Scholte, Jan A. 2004. "Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Global Governance," *Government and Opposition* 39(2): 211-233.

SESSION 13 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

Non-state Actors in Global Governance: Global Corporations, Civil society, NGOs, Think Tanks, Global Philanthropy (Lecture/Seminar)

Recommended:

- Carpenter, R. Charli. 2007. "Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issue Emergence and Nonemergence in Transnational Advocacy Networks," *International Studies Quarterly* 51(1): 99-120.
- Cooley, Alexander, and James Ron. 2002. "The NGO Scramble," *International Security*, 27(1): 5-39.
- Ingram, Paul, Jeffrey Robinson, and Marc L. Busch. 2005. "The Intergovernmental Network of World Trade: IGO Connectedness, Governance, and Embeddedness," *American Journal of Sociology* 111(3): 824-858.
- Karns, Margaret P., and Karen A. Mingst. 2015. *International Organizations*. The Politics and Processes of Global Governance (Chapter 6, "Nonstate Actors: NGOs, Networks, and Social Movements").
- Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, chs.1,3.

- Kim, Dongwood. 2013 "International Nongovernmental Organizations and the Global Diffusion of National Human Rights Institutions," *International Organization* 67(3): 505–539.
- Murdie, Amanda, and Alexander Hicks. 2013. "Can International Nongovernmental Organizations Boost Government Services? The Case of Health," *International Organization* 67(3): 541-573.
- Murdie, Amanda, and Dursun Peksen. 2014. "The Impact of Human Rights INGO Shaming on Humanitarian Interventions," *Journal of Politics* 76(1): 215-228.
- Murdie, Amanda. 2014. "The Ties that Bind: A Network Analysis of Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations," *British Journal of Political Science* 44(1): 1-27.
- Price, Richard M. 2003. "Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics," *World Politics* 55(4): 579-606.
- Price, Richard. 1998. "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," *International Organization* 52(3): 613-644.
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995. "Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction" In: Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Scholte, Jan A. 2004. "Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Global Governance," *Government and Opposition* 39(2): 211-233.

SESSION 14 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

Environmental Institutions, Climate Change, and Transnational Governance (Lecture)

Book Chapters: International Organization and Global Governance (Chapter 45 "Global Environmental Governance" 630-642) (See Bibliography)

Article: Transnational Actors and Transnational Governance in Global Environmental Politics (Annual Review of Political Science 23(1): 203-220. 2020) (CED)

Article: The Regime Complex for Climate Change (Perspectives on Politics 9(1): 7-23. 2011) (CED)

Recommended:

- Bernauer, Thomas. 1995. "The Effect of International Environmental Institutions: How We Might Learn More," *International Organization* 49(2): 351-77.
- Betsill, Michele M., and Harriet Bulkeley. 2004. "Transnational Networks and Global Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program," *International Studies Quarterly* 48(2): 471–93.
- Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette, and Teale Phelps-Bondarof. 2014. "From Advocacy to Confrontation. Direct Enforcement by Environmental NGO," *International Studies Quarterly* 58(2): 348-361.
- Falkner, Robert, Hannes Stephan, and John Vogler. 2010. "International Climate Policy after Copenhagen: Towards a 'Building Blocks' Approach," *Global Policy* 1(3): 252-262.
- Hale, Thomas, David Held, and Kevin Young. 2013. *Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation is Failing when We Need It Most*, Polity.
- Hardin, Garrett. 1968. "The Tragedy of the Commons," *Science* 162: 1243-48.
- Keohane, Robert O., and Kal Raustiala. 2009. "Toward a Post-Kyoto Climate Change Architecture: A Political Analysis," In: *Post-Kyoto International Climate Policy: Implementing*

Architectures for Agreement, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

- Raustiala, Kal. 1997. "States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions," *International Studies Quarterly* 41(4): 719-740.
- Victor, David. 2004. "Crisis and Opportunity," In: *The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 3-24.
- Urpelainen, Johannes. 2010. "Enforcing International Environmental Cooperation: Technological Standards Can Help," *The Review of International Organizations* 5(4): 475-496.

SESSION 15 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

Midterm Exam

The midterm exam will take place as an open-book, 90-minute examination. It will consist of several short-essay questions.

SESSION 16 (ASYNCHRONOUS)

Case: The International Monetary Fund - IMF conditionality

Working Paper: Making the Global Financial System Work for All (G20, EPG)

Article: David Lipton The Future of Bretton Woods (July 16, 2019; IMF)

Multimedia Documentation: Monitor (IMF)

SESSION 17 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

Global Financial and Development Governance: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) (Lecture/Discussion)

Recommended:

- Ban, Cornel. 2015. "Austerity versus Stimulus? Understanding Fiscal Policy Change at the International Monetary Fund since the Great Recession," *Governance* 28(2): 167-183.
- Bird, Graham. 1996. "The International Monetary Fund and Developing Countries: A Review of the Evidence and Policy Options," *International Organization* 50(3): 477-511.
- Bird, Graham. 2001. "IMF Programs: Do They Work? Can They Be Made to Work Better?" *World Development* 29(11): 1849-1865.
- Copelovitch, Mark. 2010. "Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending," *International Studies Quarterly* 54(1): 49-77.
- Copelovitch, Mark. 2010. *The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy: Banks, Bonds, and Bailouts*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Dollar, David, and Jakob Svensson. 2000. "What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programs?" *Economic Journal* 110: 894-917.
- Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James R. Vreeland. 2009. "Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions?" *Journal of Development Economics* 88(1): 1-18.
- Gilbert, Christopher L., and David Vines. 2000. "The World Bank: An Overview of Some Major Issues," In: Christopher L. Gilbert and David Vines (eds.), *The World Bank: Structure and Policies*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, pp. 10-36.
- Haggard, Stephan. 1985. "The Politics of Adjustment: Lessons from the IMF's Extended Fund

- Facility," *International Organization* 39(3): 505-534.
- Killick, Tony. 1996. "Principals, Agents, and the Limitations of IMF Conditionality," *World Economy* 19(2): 211-229.
 - Martin, Lisa. 2006. "Distribution, Information and Delegation to International Organizations: The Case of IMF Conditionality," In: Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney (eds.), *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
 - Mukherjee, Bumba, and David Andrew Singer. 2010. "International Institutions and Domestic Compensation: The IMF and the Politics of Capital Account Liberalization," *American Journal of Political Science* 54(1): 45–60.
 - Nooruddin, Irfan, and Joel Simmons. 2006. "The Politics of Hard Choices: IMF Programs and Government Spending," *International Organization* 60(4): 1001-1033.
 - Przeworski, Adam, and James R. Vreeland. 2000. "The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth," *Journal of Development Economics* 62: 385-421.
 - Rodrik, Dani. 2006. "Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank's 'Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform,'" *Journal of Economic Literature* 44(4): 973–987.
 - Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2004. "Capital Market Liberalization, Globalization, and the IMF," *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 20(1): 57-71.
 - Thacker, Strom C. 1999. "The High Politics of IMF Lending," *World Politics* 52(1): 38-75.
 - Vreeland, James R. 2003. *The IMF and Economic Development*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
 - Vreeland, James R. 2007. *The International Monetary Fund*, London, UK: Routledge.

SESSION 18 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

Global Financial and Development Governance: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) (Lecture/Discussion)

Book Chapters: International Organization and Global Governance (Chapter 42 "Global Financial Governance" (591-602), Chapter 44 "Global Development Governance" (616-629) (See Bibliography)

Book Chapters: The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and their Borrowers (chs. 1, 7. Cornell University Press, 2006) (See Bibliography)

Article: The Scope of IMF Conditionality (International Organization 62(4): 589-620. 2008) (CED)

Other / Complementary Documentation: International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Other / Complementary Documentation: World Bank (s-c)

Recommended:

- Ban, Cornel. 2015. "Austerity versus Stimulus? Understanding Fiscal Policy Change at the International Monetary Fund since the Great Recession," *Governance* 28(2): 167-183.
- Bird, Graham. 1996. "The International Monetary Fund and Developing Countries: A Review of the Evidence and Policy Options," *International Organization* 50(3): 477-511.
- Bird, Graham. 2001. "IMF Programs: Do They Work? Can They Be Made to Work Better?" *World Development* 29(11): 1849-1865.
- Copelovitch, Mark. 2010. "Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of

- IMF Lending," *International Studies Quarterly* 54(1): 49-77.
- Copelovitch, Mark. 2010. *The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy: Banks, Bonds, and Bailouts*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
 - Dollar, David, and Jakob Svensson. 2000. "What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programs?" *Economic Journal* 110: 894-917.
 - Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James R. Vreeland. 2009. "Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions?" *Journal of Development Economics* 88(1): 1-18.
 - Gilbert, Christopher L., and David Vines. 2000. "The World Bank: An Overview of Some Major Issues," In: Christopher L. Gilbert and David Vines (eds.), *The World Bank: Structure and Policies*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, pp. 10-36.
 - Haggard, Stephan. 1985. "The Politics of Adjustment: Lessons from the IMF's Extended Fund Facility," *International Organization* 39(3): 505-534.
 - Killick, Tony. 1996. "Principals, Agents, and the Limitations of IMF Conditionality," *World Economy* 19(2): 211-229.
 - Martin, Lisa. 2006. "Distribution, Information and Delegation to International Organizations: The Case of IMF Conditionality," In: Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney (eds.), *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
 - Mukherjee, Bumba, and David Andrew Singer. 2010. "International Institutions and Domestic Compensation: The IMF and the Politics of Capital Account Liberalization," *American Journal of Political Science* 54(1): 45-60.
 - Nooruddin, Irfan, and Joel Simmons. 2006. "The Politics of Hard Choices: IMF Programs and Government Spending," *International Organization* 60(4): 1001-1033.
 - Przeworski, Adam, and James R. Vreeland. 2000. "The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth," *Journal of Development Economics* 62: 385-421.
 - Rodrik, Dani. 2006. "Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank's 'Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform,'" *Journal of Economic Literature* 44(4): 973-987.
 - Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2004. "Capital Market Liberalization, Globalization, and the IMF," *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 20(1): 57-71.
 - Thacker, Strom C. 1999. "The High Politics of IMF Lending," *World Politics* 52(1): 38-75.
 - Vreeland, James R. 2003. *The IMF and Economic Development*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
 - Vreeland, James R. 2007. *The International Monetary Fund*, London, UK: Routledge.

SESSION 19 (ASYNCHRONOUS)

Simulation: WTO Doha Round negotiations - Joint Ministerial Decision

Article: The WTO on Trial (Foreign Affairs 82(1): 130-140. 2003) (CED)

Article: Is WTO Dispute Settlement Effective? (Global Governance 10(2): 207-225. 2004) (CED)

Article: Stability and Rigidity: Politics and the Design of the WTO's Dispute Resolution Procedure (American Political Science Review 99(3): 389-400. 2005) (CED)

SESSION 20 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

Economic Trade Governance: The World Trade Organization (WTO) (Lecture)

Recommended:

- Bown, Chad P. 2005. "Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes," *World Economy* 27(1): 59-80.
- Davis, Christina. 2005. *Food Fights over Free Trade*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Elsig, Manfred. 2011. "Principal-agent Theory and the World Trade Organization: Complex Agency and 'Missing Delegation'," *European Journal of International Relations* 17(3): 495-517.
- Guzman, Andrew, and Beth A. Simmons. 2002. "To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization," *Journal of Legal Studies* 36: S205-S235.
- Hoekman, Bernard M., and Petros C. Mavroidis. 2000. "WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and Surveillance," *World Economy* 23(4): 527-542.
- Hoekman, Bernard M., and Petros C. Mavroidis. 2007. *World Trade Organization (WTO)*, London, UK: Routledge.
- Kim, Soo Yeon. 2010. *Power and the Governance of Global Trade*, Cornell University Press.
- Kim, Soo Yeon, and Gabriele Spilker. 2019. Global Value Chains and the Political Economy of WTO Disputes. *The Review of International Organizations* 14: 239-260.
- Maggi, Giovanni. 1999. "The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade," *American Economic Review* 89(1): 190-214.
- Narlikar, Amrita. 2005. *The World Trade Organization: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Narlikar, Amrita. 2010. "New Powers in the Club: The Challenges of Global Trade Governance," *International Affairs* 86(3): 717-728.
- Rose, Andrew. 2004. "Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?" *American Economic Review* 94(1): 98-114.
- Staiger, Robert W. 1995. "International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy," In Gene M. Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff (eds.), *Handbook of International Economics*, vol. III, New York, NY: Elsevier, pp. 1495-1551.
- Woolcock, Stephen. 2013. "Getting Past the WTO Deadlock: The Plurilateral Option," European University Institute RSCAS PP; 2013/08.
- Zahrnt, Valentin. 2008. "Domestic Constituents and the Formulation of WTO Negotiating Positions: What the Delegates Say," *World Trade Review* 7(2): 393-421.

SESSION 21 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

Economic Trade Governance: The World Trade Organization (WTO) (Negotiations Simulation)

Book Chapters: International Organization and Global Governance (Chapter 43 "Global Trade Governance" 603-615) (See Bibliography)

Article: What You Should Know About Globalization and the World Trade Organization (Review of International Economics, 10: 404-423. 2002) (CED)

Article: Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of GATT and the WTO on World Trade (International Organization 61(1): 37-67. 2007) (CED)

Other / Complementary Documentation: World Trade Organization (WTO)

Recommended:

- Bown, Chad P. 2005. "Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes," *World Economy* 27(1): 59-80.
- Davis, Christina. 2005. *Food Fights over Free Trade*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Elsig, Manfred. 2011. "Principal-agent Theory and the World Trade Organization: Complex Agency and 'Missing Delegation'," *European Journal of International Relations* 17(3): 495-517.
- Guzman, Andrew, and Beth A. Simmons. 2002. "To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization," *Journal of Legal Studies* 36: S205-S235.
- Hoekman, Bernard M., and Petros C. Mavroidis. 2000. "WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and Surveillance," *World Economy* 23(4): 527-542.
- Hoekman, Bernard M., and Petros C. Mavroidis. 2007. *World Trade Organization (WTO)*, London, UK: Routledge.
- Kim, Soo Yeon. 2010. *Power and the Governance of Global Trade*, Cornell University Press.
- Kim, Soo Yeon, and Gabriele Spilker. 2019. Global Value Chains and the Political Economy of WTO Disputes. *The Review of International Organizations* 14: 239-260.
- Maggi, Giovanni. 1999. "The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade," *American Economic Review* 89(1): 190-214.
- Narlikar, Amrita. 2005. *The World Trade Organization: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Narlikar, Amrita. 2010. "New Powers in the Club: The Challenges of Global Trade Governance," *International Affairs* 86(3): 717-728.
- Rose, Andrew. 2004. "Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?" *American Economic Review* 94(1): 98-114.
- Staiger, Robert W. 1995. "International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy," In Gene M. Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff (eds.), *Handbook of International Economics*, vol. III, New York, NY: Elsevier, pp. 1495-1551.
- Woolcock, Stephen. 2013. "Getting Past the WTO Deadlock: The Plurilateral Option," European University Institute RSCAS PP; 2013/08.
- Zahrnt, Valentin. 2008. "Domestic Constituents and the Formulation of WTO Negotiating Positions: What the Delegates Say," *World Trade Review* 7(2): 393-421.

SESSION 22 (ASYNCHRONOUS)

Case-study: The United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

Book Chapters: International Organization and Global Governance (Chapter 32 "The UN Security Council and Peace Operations" (455-470), Chapter 38 "Humanitarian Intervention and R2P" (534-545) (See Bibliography)

Practical Case: Going to the United Nations: George W. Bush and Iraq (GUI Case 304) (Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy)

SESSION 23 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

The United Nations (UN) System (Lecture/Seminar)

Article: *Reforming the United Nations (The Brown Journal of World Affairs 14(2): 11-21. 2008) (CED)*

Article: *Why the Security Council Failed (Foreign Affairs 82, no. 3 (2003): 16–34) (CED)*

Book Chapters: *International Organization and Global Governance (Chapter 16 "The UN System" (223-235), Chapter 17 "The UN General Assembly" (236-249) (See Bibliography)*

Article: *How to Fix the United Nations (2016, Foreign Policy) (CED)*

Video: *United to Reform (United Nations)*

Recommended:

- Diehl, Paul, Jennifer Reifschneider, and Paul R. Hensel. 1996. "United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict," *International Organization* 50(4): 683-700.
- Hurd, Ian. 2002. "Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council," *Global Governance* 8(1): 35-51.
- Kuziemko, Ilyana, and Eric Werker. 2006. "How Much is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations," *Journal of Political Economy* 114(5): 905-930.
- Lake, David. 2001. "Beyond Anarchy: The Importance of Security Institutions," *International Security* 26(1): 129-160.
- Morris, Justin, and Nicholas J. Wheeler. 2007. "The Security Council's Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use of Force," *International Politics* 44(214?231): 214? 231.
- Thompson, Alex. 2006. "Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission," *International Organization* 61(1): 1-34.
- Voeten, Erik. 2001. "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action," *American Political Science Review* 95(4): 845-58.
- Voeten, Erik. 2005. "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force," *International Organization* 59(3): 527-57.

SESSION 24 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

The United Nations (UN) System (Lecture/Seminar)

Recommended:

- Diehl, Paul, Jennifer Reifschneider, and Paul R. Hensel. 1996. "United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict," *International Organization* 50(4): 683-700.
- Hurd, Ian. 2002. "Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council," *Global Governance* 8(1): 35-51.
- Kuziemko, Ilyana, and Eric Werker. 2006. "How Much is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations," *Journal of Political Economy* 114(5): 905-930.
- Lake, David. 2001. "Beyond Anarchy: The Importance of Security Institutions," *International Security* 26(1): 129-160.
- Morris, Justin, and Nicholas J. Wheeler. 2007. "The Security Council's Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use of Force," *International Politics* 44(214?231): 214? 231.
- Thompson, Alex. 2006. "Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission," *International Organization* 61(1): 1-34.
- Voeten, Erik. 2001. "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action," *American Political Science Review* 95(4): 845-58.
- Voeten, Erik. 2005. "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the

Use of Force," *International Organization* 59(3): 527-57.

SESSION 25 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

The Backlash Against Globalization, the Politics of Disintegration, and the Birth and Death of International Organizations (Lecture/Seminar)

Book Chapters: The Backlash Against Globalization and the Future of the International Economic Order (Patrick Diamond (ed.), The Crisis of Globalization: Democracy, Capitalism, and Inequality in the 21st Century, I.B. Tauris. 2019) (CED)

Working Paper: Transforming Global Governance for the 21st Century (OCCASIONAL PAPER 2013/09) (UNDP)

Article: Hello, Goodbye: When Do States Withdraw from International Organizations? (The Review of International Organization 14: 335-366. 2019) (CED)

Recommended:

- Bearce, David H., and Brandy J. Jolliff Scott. 2019. "Popular Non-support for International Organizations: How Extensive and What Does This Represent?" *The Review of International Organizations* 14(2): 187-216.
- Bisbee, James, Layna Mosley, Thomas B. Pepinsky, and Peter B. Rosendorff. 2020. "Decompensating Domestically: The Political Economy of Anti-globalism," *Journal of European Public Policy* 27(7): 1090-1102.
- Copelovitch, Mark, and Jon C. W. Pevehouse. 2019. "International Organizations in a New Era of Populist Nationalism." *The Review of International Organizations* 14(2): 169-186.
- Copelovitch, Mark, Sara B. Hobolt, and Stefanie Walter. 2020. "Challenges to the Contemporary Global Order: Cause for Pessimism or Optimism?" *Journal of European Public Policy* 27(7): 1114-1125.
- De Witte, Bruno. 2017. "The Future of Variable Geometry in a Post-Brexit European Union," *Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law* 24(2): 153-157.
- Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette. 2020. "Death of International Organizations: The Organizational Ecology of Intergovernmental Organizations, 1815–2015," *The Review of International Organizations* 15: 339-370.
- Eilstrup-Sangiovanni Mette. 2020. "What Kills International Organisations? When and Why International Organisations Terminate," *European Journal of International Relations*.
- Ferguson, Niall. 2016. "Populism as a Backlash against Globalization - Historical Perspectives".
- Gray, Julia. 2018. "Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of International Organizations," *International Studies Quarterly* 62(1): 1-13.
- Walter, Stefanie (forthcoming). "The Backlash against Globalization," *Annual Review of Political Science*.

SESSION 26 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

Re-imagining globalization, restoring inter-personal and institutional trust and finding common ground for cooperation (Guest Speaker/ Discussion)

Article: A Renewed World Organization for the 21st Century (July 2018, Democracy Without Borders)

Article: The Resurgent Idea of World Government (Ethics & International Affairs 22(2): 133–42.

2008) (CED)

Article: *Global Governance and Future Challenges* (Columbia University's second annual Global Thought lecture, 02 May 2014) (Oxford Martin School)

Article: *The G20 at a Crossroads: The Future of Global Governance* (May 30, 2018; G20 Insights)

Working Paper: *The Future of the G20 and its Place in Global Governance* (G20 Papers | No. 5, April 2011) (CIGI)

Video: *Why we need to rethink global governance* (World Economic Forum)

SESSION 27 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

Group presentations: Fix this RO

Students should choose a regional organization (RO) not covered in class ([African Union](#), [Arab League](#), [ASEAN](#), [MERCOSUR](#), [NATO](#), [OPEC](#)) and prepare a 15-minute group presentation addressing the following:

- Historical background, institutional design, and policy mandate of the IO
- A current policy challenge that the RO is confronted with
- Potential solutions for the institution and political feasibility
- Future outlook

SESSION 28 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

Group presentations: Fix this IO

Students should choose an international organization (IO) not covered in class ([ICAO](#) or [IMO](#), [ICC](#), [ILO](#), [IOM](#), [OECD](#), [OSCE](#), [WHO](#)) and prepare a 15-minute group presentation addressing the following:

- Historical background, institutional design, and policy mandate of the IO
- A current policy challenge that the IO is confronted with
- Potential solutions for the institution and political feasibility
- Future outlook

SESSION 29 (LIVE IN-PERSON)

Group presentations: Fix this IO

Students should choose an international organization (IO) not covered in class ([ICAO](#) or [IMO](#), [ICC](#), [ILO](#), [IOM](#), [OECD](#), [OSCE](#), [WHO](#)) and prepare a 15-minute group presentation addressing the following:

- Historical background, institutional design, and policy mandate of the IO
- A current policy challenge that the IO is confronted with
- Potential solutions for the institution and political feasibility
- Future outlook

SESSION 30 (ASYNCHRONOUS)

Final Essay

Your final grade will also be determined by a 1,500-word (+/- 10%) final essay to be submitted within 48 hours on one of the IOs covered in the second part of the course.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Compulsory

- Weiss, Thomas G., and Rorden Wilkinson.. (2018). *International Organization and Global Governance*. 2nd. Routledge. ISBN 9781138236585 (Printed)

null

Recommended

- World Politics: Interests, Interactions and Institutions. (2018). *Frieden, Jeffrey A., David A. Lake, and Kenneth A. Schultz*. ISBN 9780393689 (Digital)

null

- Karns, Margaret P., Karen A. Mingst, and Kendall W. Stiles. (2015). *International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance*. ISBN 9781626371514 (Printed)

null

- Ngaire Woods. (2006). *The globalizers : the IMF, the World Bank, and their borrowers*. Cornell University Press. ISBN 9780801456015 (Digital)

EVALUATION CRITERIA

Your final grade in the course will be based on both individual and group work of different characteristics that will be weighted in the following way:

Criteria	Percentage	Comments
Class participation	10 %	Class participation (synchronous and asynchronous)
Group presentation	15 %	Presentation on an IO not covered in class
Group memo	15 %	Group memo on an IO not covered in class
Midterm exam	25 %	Midterm exam
Final Essay	35 %	Final Essay

A. CLASS PARTICIPATION (10%)

Your class participation will be evaluated on the basis of your oral and written contributions to (synchronous and asynchronous) discussions, exercises, and case studies. Besides oral participation in in-class discussions, you are encouraged to use Twitter and the Discussion Board as media of written expression and communication. Three main criteria will be used in reaching judgment about your class participation:

- Depth and quality of contribution: The most important dimension of participation concerns what it is that you are saying. A high quality comment reveals depth of insight, rigorous use of case evidence, consistency of argument, and realism.

- Moving your peers' understanding forward: Great ideas can be lost through poor presentation. A high quality presentation of ideas must consider the relevance and timing of comments, and the flow and content of the ensuing class discussion. It demands comments that are concise and clear, and that are conveyed with a spirit of involvement in the discussion at hand.
- Frequency: Frequency refers to the attainment of a threshold quantity of contributions that is sufficient for making a reliable assessment of comment quality. The logic is simple: if contributions are too few, one cannot reliably assess the quality of your remarks. However, once threshold quantity has been achieved, simply increasing the number of times you talk does not automatically improve your evaluation. Beyond the threshold, it is the quality of your comments that must improve. In particular, one must be especially careful that in claiming more than a fair share of "airtime", quality is not sacrificed for quantity. Finally, your attempts at participation should not be such that the instructor has to "go looking for you". You should be attempting to get into the debate on a regular basis.

Students are encouraged to express their opinions openly, respectfully, and enthusiastically in class. Being a bit shy is only natural and tends to disappear when people feel comfortable in a friendly environment. After all, your participation in class is also an opportunity to hone your interpersonal, presentation, and debating skills, which would prove valuable in your future life.

The class participation component of the grade will depend on actual contributions to class discussion. Depth, quality, and frequency of your contributions will contribute very positively to your final grade. A top grade will be attributed to students who express their opinion in a logically consistent manner, supported by evidence, and showing that the mandatory readings were done.

If you feel uncomfortable speaking in public, you can also participate by sending comments or relevant materials that add to the class discussion by email or expressing your thoughts or ideas during the break or after class. This will contribute positively to your final grade and can make up for lesser participation in plenary sessions.

Active participation in class exercises, the final debate and engagement with the guest speaker(s) will also contribute to your participation grade. Students are encouraged to make full use of these options.

B. GROUP PRESENTATIONS & POLICY BRIEFS (MEMOS) (30%)

You will be asked to prepare a group presentation and submit a group memo (of 1,000 words +/- 10%) on an IO not covered in class and the challenges it faces.

1. A group presentation (15%)

At the beginning of the term students should choose an international organization and a potential challenge facing the institution. Students should prepare and deliver a 15-minute presentation in teams addressing the following:

- Background of the International Organization,
- Assessment of the governance structure and the organization's activities,
- Challenge facing the institution,
- Key policy recommendations to the leadership of the institution,
- Future outlook for this institution.

Each presentation will be followed by a brief discussion.

2. A policy brief (memo) related to the topic of the presentation (15%)

Objective: The memo should focus on addressing a particular challenge that the IO/RO is faced with. Students should conduct desk research, compare distinct arguments, support the argument that they consider to be most compelling (more logical, better supported by empirical evidence, or both), and formulate recommendations to the management of this organization. This assignment will improve students' ability to critically examine arguments, to support a given one with evidence, and to derive policy advice from it.

- Length: 1,000 words +/- 10%, not including tables and bibliography.
- Reference system: Harvard, Chicago or, APA (<http://www.citethisforme.com/>).
- Format: Times New Roman size 12; 1,5 paragraph space; include student name, number, and course name on the right hand corner of the first page.
- Plagiarism: Plagiarism is obviously prohibited and subject to IEU disciplinary rules. Papers are submitted through Turnitin and plagiarism is assessed according to its criteria (see <https://www.turnitin.com/solutions/plagiarism-prevention>).
- Submission deadline: The policy memo is to be submitted within two weeks following the group presentation.

C. MIDTERM EXAM (25%)

The midterm exam will take place online (via the Campus Online platform) as an open-book, 90-minute examination. It will consist of several short-essay questions.

The midterm exam will consist of two parts:

1. Two shorter questions about some of the concepts and main themes covered during the course (each answer should be of up to 500 words).
2. A longer essay question which will test the student's reasoning capacity and ability to articulate their own thinking on the topic of the course, based on what has been learnt during the first part of the course (the answer should have a maximum of 1,200 words).

D. FINAL ESSAY (35%)

Your final grade will also be determined by a 1,500-word (+/- 10%) final essay to be submitted within 48 hours on one of the IOs covered in the second part of the course. All rules of proper academic writing should be followed, in terms of proper citing, referencing, and formatting. You are expected to cite at least two academic readings from the syllabus; failure to do so will be explicitly penalized. Clearly, no form of plagiarism or self-plagiarism will be tolerated! Please see below for University Guidelines on what constitutes plagiarism or self-plagiarism. You are required to obtain the minimum grade of 5 required to pass the course.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Each student has four attempts over two consecutive academic years to pass this course.

For every BIR Program mandatory class aside from the IR Unplugged and BIR Electives, students are required to obtain the minimum grade of 5 required to pass the course. Students whose grade in the Final Exam (or the largest assignment) is below 5 will fail the course. The rule applies to whichever assignment carries the greatest weight to the final grade

Dates and location of the final exam will be posted in advance and will not be changed.

Students must attend at least 70% of the sessions. Students who do not comply with the 70% attendance rule will receive a 0.0 on their first and second attempts and go directly to the third one (they will need to enroll in this course again the following academic year).

Students who are in the third or fourth attempt must contact the professor during the first two weeks of the course.

The Bachelor's in International Relations pursues to develop the knowledge, skills and attitudes for bringing transformative and sustainable change in today's world. Therefore, all the courses follow the principles of sustainability and diversity. Firstly, this course considers the Agenda 2030 and builds upon the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with a special focus on SDG 1, 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, and 17. Secondly, this course is committed to an inclusive learning environment and looks to be enriched and enhanced by diversity along numerous dimensions, including race, ethnicity and national origins, gender and gender identity, sexuality, class and religion.

ATTENDANCE

In-person attendance is **mandatory** at IE University, as it is an essential factor of IE's learning methodology. While we do closely monitor attendance in each course, we also consider our students responsible for their own agenda and commitments, as adult university students. With that in mind, each student may miss up to 30% of the sessions within a given course and still maintain the possibility of passing that given course. This 30% "buffer" is to be used for any absences, such as: illnesses, personal emergencies, commitments, official/governmental matters, business and/or medical appointments, family situations, etc. Students should manage their various needs, and situations that may arise, within that 30% buffer. If a student is absent to more than the allowed 30% of the sessions (regardless of the reason), s/he will obtain a 0.0 grade for that course in both the ordinary and extraordinary calls of the current academic year, and s/he will have to retake the course during the following academic year.

Please pay close attention to your attendance. The program strongly encourages attending 100% of the sessions as it will improve your learning outcomes, it will increase the class performance and it will benefit your participation grade. Noncompliance with deadlines for Non-Classroom Learning activities or assignments will result in an absence for the session.

Extreme cases involving emergencies such as: extended hospitalizations, accidents, serious illnesses and other cases of force majeure, are to be consulted with the Program Management (bir.madridoffice@ie.edu) for assessment of the situation and corresponding documentation, in order to support and guide each student optimally.

For more information about the university attendance policy, please check; <https://www.ie.edu/student-guide/bir/policies-and-guidelines/attendance/>

RETAKE POLICY

Any student whose weighted final grade is below 5 will be required to sit for the retake exam to pass the course (except those not complying with the attendance rules, whom are banned from this possibility).

Grading for retakes will be subject to the following rules:

- The retakes will consist of a comprehensive exam or equivalent assignment. The grade will depend only on the performance on this exam; continuous evaluation over the semester will not be taken into account.
- Dates and location of the retakes will be posted in advance and will not be changed.
- The exam/assignment will be designed bearing in mind that the passing grade is 5 and the maximum grade that can be attained is 8 out of 10.

PLAGIARISM / ACADEMIC HONESTY

Plagiarism is the dishonest act of presenting another person's ideas, texts or words as your own. This includes in order of seriousness of the offense:

- providing faulty sources;
- copy-pasting material from your own past assignments (self-plagiarism) without the instructor's permission;
- copy-pasting material from external sources even while citing them;
- using verbatim translations from sources in other languages without citing them;
- copy-pasting material from external sources without citing them;
- and buying or commissioning essays from other parties.

IEU students must contact the professor if they don't know whether the use of a document constitutes plagiarism. For help with your academic writing, contact the Writing Center (writingcenter@faculty.ie.edu). The professor will also advise the student on how to present said material. All written assignments must be submitted through Turn-it-in, which produces a similarity report and detects cases of plagiarism. Professors are required to check each student's academic work in order to guarantee its originality. If the originality of the academic work is not clear, the professor will contact the student in order to clarify any doubts. Students using external tutorial support should report it to the professor and the BIR Program from the moment they began receiving this support. In the event that the meeting with the student fails to clarify the originality of the academic work, the professor will inform the Director of the Bachelor Program about the case, who will then decide whether to bring the case forward to the BIR Academic Review Panel. Very high similarity scores will be automatically flagged and forwarded to the Academic Review Panel. Plagiarism constitutes a very serious offense and may carry penalties ranging from getting a zero for the assignment to expulsion from the university depending on the severity of the case and the number of times the student has committed plagiarism in the past.

PROFESSOR BIO

Professor: **TIHOMIR TSENKULOVSKI**

E-mail: ttsenkulovski@faculty.ie.edu

Tihomir Tsenkulovski has extensive international experience spanning academia, the private sector, and international organizations. He is a Ph.D. candidate in Organization Studies at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland. His Ph.D. inquiry is concerned with international norm dynamics and creative city making – how the discourse on the role of cultural and creative industries for sustainable urban development is translated into local practices in Brazil and Argentina in the context of the UNESCO Creative Cities network. At the beginning of 2020 he conducted ethnographic fieldwork in Latin America with the support of the Swiss National Science Foundation. In 2021 he was a visiting research fellow at the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI). He is currently a research and teaching assistant in sustainability innovation at the Institute of Technology Management, the University of St. Gallen. In 2021 and 2022 he was part of the Academic Jury for the Global Essay Competition of the St. Gallen Symposium - a prominent platform for cross-generational dialogue and collaboration.

Tihomir attained a Master's degree in Law and Diplomacy at the Fletcher School, Tufts University as a Fulbright scholar with Certificates in Strategic Management and Diplomatic Studies and completed coursework at Harvard Business School and the Harvard Kennedy School. He holds a second Master's degree in International Relations and Diplomacy of the European Union from the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium which he obtained thanks to a scholarship from the European Commission in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy. During his graduate studies, he gathered experience as a project lead at the University of Pennsylvania, as a DAAD research fellow in Economics at the Humboldt University of Berlin, as a research assistant at Harvard Law School, as a staff editor for The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, and as an election observer for the European Union in Bolivia. His professional experience also includes working as a Strategic Business Manager in the Intellectual Property & Science department of Thomson Reuters & Clarivate Analytics, as a researcher in the framework of the Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation program, as a management consultant to a high-level working group at the World Bank Group, Scholastic Inc., UNIDO, and UNOV/UNODC.

OTHER INFORMATION

Office hours: C/ María de Molina 12 (4th floor) or via Zoom / Skype (by appointment)

Contact details: ttsenkulovski@faculty.ie.edu (email)

CODE OF CONDUCT IN CLASS

1. Be on time. Students arriving more than 5 minutes late will be marked as “Absent”. Only students that notify in advance in writing that they will be late for a specific session may be granted an exception (at the discretion of the professor). Students attending online must always have their cameras on during the session or risk being marked absent.
2. If applicable, bring your name card and strictly follow the seating chart. It helps faculty members and fellow students learn your names.
3. Do not leave the room during the lecture: Students are not allowed to leave the room during lectures. If a student leaves the room during lectures, he/she will not be allowed to re-enter and, therefore, will be marked as “Absent”. Only students that notify that they have a special reason to leave the session early will be granted an exception (at the discretion of the professor).
4. Do not engage in side conversation. As a sign of respect toward the person presenting the lecture (the teacher as well as fellow students), side conversations are not allowed. If you have a question, raise your hand and ask it. If you do not want to ask it during the lecture, feel free to approach your teacher after class. If a student is disrupting the flow of the lecture, he/she will be asked to leave the classroom and, consequently, will be marked as “Absent”.
5. Use your laptop for course-related purposes only. The use of laptops during lectures must be authorized by the professor.
6. The use of Social Media or accessing any type of content not related to the lecture is penalized. The student will be asked to leave the room and, consequently, will be marked as “Absent”.
7. No cellular phones: IE University implements a “Phone-free Classroom” policy and, therefore, the use of phones, tablets, etc. is forbidden inside the classroom. Failing to abide by this rule entails expulsion from the room and will be counted as one absence.
8. Escalation policy: 1/3/5. Items 4, 5, and 6 above entail expulsion from the classroom and the consequent marking of the student as “Absent.” IE University implements an “escalation policy”: The first time a student is asked to leave the room for disciplinary reasons (as per items 4, 5, and 6 above), the student will incur one absence, the second time it will count as three absences, and from the third time onward, any expulsion from the classroom due to disciplinary issues will entail 5 absences.